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Readers of this journal will undoubtedly be familiar with 
the biblical scholarship of Robert Sacks. His commentaries on the Book of 
Genesis and the Book of Job first appeared in Interpretation before being 
published as books in their own right (in 1990 and 1999, respectively).1 In his 
distinguished career as a teacher and scholar at St. John’s College for more 
than five decades, Sacks has dedicated much of his work to a noble cause: 
restoring the Bible as a worthy source of Western civilization. The project is 
rooted in the belief that the well-being of the West depends on two sources, 
reason and revelation. As he writes in his introduction to the commentary 
on Job:
We of the Western tradition have the blessing and the curse of finding 
ourselves heir to two quite different ways of life and hence to two quite 
different ways of thought. Although they sit uneasily together, the 
struggle between them has formed much of the life behind the growth 
of both our daily language and of our highest contemplations. They 
are, then, the foundation of both our deepest insights and our deep-
1 Robert Sacks, A Commentary on the Book of Genesis (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1990); origi-
nally serialized as “The Lion and the Ass: A Commentary on the Book of Genesis,” Interpretation 
8 (1979–80): 29–101; 9 (1980–81): 1–82; 10 (1982): 67–212, 273–317; 11 (1983): 87–128, 249–74, 353–82; 
12 (1984): 49–82, 141–92. Sacks, The Book of Job with Commentary: A Translation for Our Time 
(Atlanta, GA: Scholars, 1999); originally serialized in Interpretation 24 (1996–97): 135–70, 251–86; 25 
(1997–98): 3–36, 155–80, 293–330; 26 (1998–99): 21–64.
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est prejudices. As such they have given rise to that particular horizon 
within which we live, and beyond which we constantly strive to peer.2 
It is difficult to say which part of this statement would meet with greater skep-
ticism among contemporary intellectuals. Many would undoubtedly reject 
both philosophy and revelation as offering profound guidance to living well. 
Indeed, the arguments against the Bible as a source of wis-
dom are so well established that they themselves form a kind of tradition. 
One of the most formidable attacks on revelation, for example, Spinoza’s 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP), was published in 1670. If modern read-
ers tend to view the Bible as a corrupt text, not “worth studying as closely as 
the works of great philosophers or poets,” this impression is likely the result 
of Spinoza’s critique of the Bible.3 In the TTP, Spinoza claims to have proved 
conclusively that scripture is “faulty, truncated, adulterated, not consistent 
with itself, that we have only fragments of it, and, finally, that the transcript 
of God’s compact that he compacted with the Jews has perished.”4 
One reason Spinoza’s argument is so persuasive is that he 
builds his critique of scripture on his impeccable knowledge of Hebrew 
grammar. The importance of grammar in Spinoza’s analysis is evident not 
only in the TTP, where he presents a minitreatise on grammar beginning 
in chapter 7, but also in the fact that he continued to study and write on 
grammar throughout his life. He had already completed thirty-two chapters 
of a work entitled Compendium grammatices linguae Hebraeae, when he 
passed away prematurely at age forty-four. The unfinished work was pub-
lished posthumously by his friends in 1677, but provides us a clear sense of 
the importance of grammar to his overall project. The primary reason that 
Spinoza devotes so much effort to Hebrew grammar is that it is a prerequisite 
for a method that will provide “a full and certain knowledge” of scripture.5 In 
his account, the Bible presents an unfinished compilation of sources that was 
arranged so hastily that textual errors and variant readings crop up repeat-
edly in the manuscripts. Despite the later efforts of the Masoretes between 
the fifth and tenth centuries to resolve these problems, variant readings and 
grammatical irregularities remain. The real problem, for Spinoza, with this 
2 Sacks, Book of Job with Commentary, ix.
3 Leon Kass, The Beginning of Wisdom: Reading Genesis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003), xi.
4 Benedict Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, trans. Martin D. Yaffe (Newburyport, MA: Focus, 
2004), 14.
5 Ibid., 91. 
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situation gradually becomes clear in his treatise, namely, that the debate over 
the meaning invites endless speculation and quarrels among readers:
we see almost everyone passing off his own comments as God’s word 
and eager for nothing else but compelling others, under the pretext of 
religion, to think as he does. We see Theologians often worried over 
how they could twist their own fantasies and wishes out of Scripture 
and fortify them with divine authority, and not doing anything with 
less misgiving and more rashness than interpreting the Scriptures.6 
The uncertainty of scripture’s literal meaning owing to its corruption encour-
ages superstition and quarreling and obscures the simple, salutary teaching 
of caritas which is essential to salvation and political stability. The TTP ini-
tiates a broad theological project to limit speculation over the meaning of 
scripture. Spinoza develops a hermeneutic that considers scripture’s claims 
mere reflections of the cultural background and prejudices of its authors. 
But the central element of this hermeneutic is a systematic grasp of Hebrew 
grammar which effectively forecloses speculation about the literal meaning 
of scripture. 
Because Spinoza assigns Hebrew grammar such a prominent 
role in his theological-political project, he is tempted to ignore or downplay 
ambiguities and grammatical irregularities in ancient Hebrew.7 He presents 
ancient Hebrew as having a clear-cut, systematic, formal grammar. Some 
scholars have claimed that his tendency to exaggerate the grammatical clar-
ity of Hebrew results from his prior philosophical commitments. According 
to Michael Morgan, Spinoza’s grammar “is guided. . .by his commitment to 
a priori reasoning akin to that found in geometry—or, in this case, in Latin, 
viewed by him as reflecting a pure, a priori structure.”8 More likely, though, 
Spinoza simply wished to discourage theological speculation on the literal 
meaning of scripture, and so constructed a Hebrew grammar “in an artificial 
manner, [with] certain rules to the Hebrew Language that are to all appear-
ances borrowed from Latin.”9 
In sharp contrast to Spinoza’s efforts to limit the meaning 
of biblical Hebrew, Sacks attempts to extend the grammatical structure of 
6 Ibid., 83.
7 Cf. Ze’ev Levy, “The Problem of Normativity in Spinoza’s Hebrew Grammar,” in Studia Spinozana, 
vol. 3 (Hanover: Walther & Walther Verlag, 1987), 388.
8 Michael L. Morgan, editor’s introduction, in Spinoza: Complete Works, ed. Morgan (Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett, 2002), 585. 
9 Levy, “Problem of Normativity,” 369.
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Hebrew historically to include the ancient Semitic languages, from Akkadian 
to Ugaritic. According to Sacks, “the Semitic languages form a much more 
closely interrelated group than do the Indo-European languages. It would be 
appropriate to think of the Semitic languages as comparable to the Romance 
languages in terms of their proximity” (3). Many of these languages are more 
ancient than Hebrew, and preserve more ancient forms of grammar and 
meaning. As such, they offer valuable clues to the origins and development 
of Hebrew. 
But Sacks extends the scope of Hebrew grammar in an even 
more fundamental way. Traditional or formal grammars view the structure 
and rules of language as abstract, given facts. This is a sensible approach when 
the objective is the acquisition of language. Speculating on the development 
of language or relation of grammar to the thoughts of past generations might 
distract a student from the task of learning the rudiments of a language. But 
the unavoidable consequence of those introductory grammars is that they 
leave the student with the impression that Hebrew presents a permanent set 
of grammatical forms that express a fixed conceptual world. Sacks laments 
this situation and compares formal grammar to a child who has lost the 
ability to decipher meaning in art: “imagine a child born into the world in 
which abstract art had so taken over the field that the child would no lon-
ger be aware of the possibility of representational art. Like those islanders 
who, we are told, cannot recognize a picture as a picture, the child might 
find Rembrandt’s self-portrait a beautiful and well-balanced combination of 
colors—no more and no less” (2). Formal grammar is particularly inadequate 
for the study of biblical Hebrew because it ignores its development and so 
limits its meaning in artificial ways. In the case of Spinoza at least, the formal 
character of his Hebrew grammar was the product of a conscious effort to 
resolve a theological-political problem. Formal grammar, to the contrary, 
is characterized by its forgetfulness of the origins and meaning of beautiful 
forms. It accomplishes the same thing as Spinoza’s grammar by inuring us to 
the ancestral thoughts embedded in language (cf. 30). 
Sacks’s intentional grammar does not ignore the formal 
rules, but rather focuses on their development in relation to the people 
who sought language to express logos. In offering a definition of a noun, for 
example, Sacks does not merely provide a synonym. An example of this sort 
of analysis—in fact, the example which inspired Sacks to pursue this non-
traditional approach to grammar—is the participle of the verb “to speak,” 
medaber. A formal grammar would simply define the word as an established 
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fact. But Sacks’s teacher once pointed out to him that it is likely a construct 
from the Hebrew words mi and dabar; that is, literally medaber means “he 
who speaks.” Once we recognize that words have histories that reflect the 
intentions and thoughts of their speakers, the study of grammar becomes an 
investigation into the development of thought itself. This approach to gram-
mar, which invites us “to rethink the position of the person who possessed 
the verb and needed the noun,” opens up a new path for biblical study (3). 
Sacks concedes that the title of his book, Beginning Biblical 
Hebrew, is a bit misleading. If the reader expects an introduction to formal 
grammar, he may be a bit perplexed by the organization of the work. Top-
ics that would appear at the beginning of a traditional grammar appear 
later in Sacks’s work. For example, the ordinal numbers are not introduced 
until chapter 13; prepositions are not covered until chapter 19. In addition, 
although there is a brief introduction to some grammatical rules, the book 
is devoted to a careful reading of a single chapter (chapter 21) of the First 
Book of Samuel. The reason for these idiosyncrasies is that Sacks intends to 
introduce readers to an intentional approach to grammar, a subject that can-
not be taught directly but must be observed: “Intentional grammar is not and 
cannot become a subject matter. It cannot be taught: a book can do no more 
than invite the reader to participate in the activity” (3). 
One reason that Sacks’s approach to language cannot be 
taught is that it lacks a single, concrete method for arriving at linguistic cer-
tainty, nor can we arrive at a clear account of the origins of language. And 
“if we do not know where language begins,” Sacks asks, “how shall we know 
where we should begin?” If various languages shared elements of a common 
grammatical structure or vocabulary, then we could point to its natural 
origins and craft a method, like Euclid, with precise definitions, postulates, 
and axioms (1). But while language points at times to a common origin, the 
profound grammatical differences between languages frustrate our quest for 
quasimathematical certainty. What is worse, the pursuit of such certainty 
comes at the cost of destroying or ignoring the very phenomena we are trying 
to capture. The conceptual world behind language and our awareness of such 
history “imperceptibly shade off into the vaguely remembered and the dimly 
seen.” In light of this terrain, Sacks says, “we have no other choice than to try 
to make the thoughts and the half-dead expressions that inhabit the morgue 
of our minds live again—not because they are true, but because they remain a 
part of us and yet are only intelligible in their living state” (171). The evidence 
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for the thoughts of the ancients oftentimes is no more than a “scrap” that jogs 
“some reminiscence” of logos (164).
Although intentional grammar is more elusive than formal 
grammar, Sacks takes great pains as a teacher to gently guide his readers. He 
outlines the scholarly controversies over the development of Hebrew gram-
mar, recommends further reading, and even offers helpful tips for using a 
lexicon (145). He encourages readers in the light of formidable difficulties and 
reassures them to keep searching even in unpromising terrain. In considering 
whether prepositions emerged from nouns or verbs, he observes: “Even if it 
should prove impossible to recoup those ancient thoughts which still remain 
part of us, such scraps as these may help a little to jog some reminiscence of 
what it meant to participate in the passage from noun to preposition and the 
dawning of a new way of thought” (163–64). At the end of this passage, Sacks 
tells his readers that he has done his best to begin the investigation, “to think 
the transition through.” 
More fundamentally, Sacks repeatedly reminds us that we 
can never be certain of the origins of language, and so must always approach 
it with wonder. Beginning Biblical Hebrew is an introduction in the sense 
that it urges us to return to the beginnings, to wonder about the origins of 
grammatical structures and the meaning of words. In his discussion of the 
word nefesh, for example, Sacks resists telling us the traditional definition 
of “soul.” Instead he shares the relevant data: the Akkadian origins of the 
word, the diverse meanings of the term in ancient Hebrew, its various uses 
in the Bible. The point is to invite readers to ponder the original concept that 
Hebrews sought to convey. His conclusion is simply an invitation to think: “I 
hesitate to offer a definition of the word nefesh, but will instead leave you to 
the dictionaries and to your own reflections” (82).
These few examples suffice to indicate that Sacks’s objective 
concerns more than supplementing the defects of modern linguistics. Inten-
tional grammar aims at rediscovering ancient thought buried in modern 
grammar, and the first step is scrutinizing “our own speech and our pres-
ent ways of thinking” (171). In his discussion of the preposition “of,” Sacks 
observes that it is natural for us to simply accept prepositions as a natural 
part of our grammar and as entirely consistent with our experience in the 
world. But prepositions “are arrived at by human thought. That means that 
an act of human thought lies within our own daily speech and modes of 
thinking which we ourselves have never thought. To that extent we lack self-
understanding. It is this situation that makes it necessary for us to go back 
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with such care in order to get a clearer glimpse of ourselves, and of the things 
that we thoughtfully take for granted” (70). 
Language provides us a handy set of concepts for organizing 
the world that we tend to accept without further scrutiny. We have inherited 
prepositions, but we can appropriate them only “by thinking through the 
gap between its present formality and those antique feelings which were its 
progenitors” (122). Sacks’s suggestion is that in order to examine ourselves 
honestly, we need to excavate the thought behind our concepts, to rediscover 
“the archaic process of thinking” (86). Intentional grammar in this sense is a 
prerequisite not only for studying revelation, but also for philosophy. 
Whereas Spinoza’s method closes off scripture as a source of 
wisdom, Sacks’s method has the very opposite effect. Consider the example 
of the notational accents, or ta’amim, which appear above and below letters in 
scripture. These markings do not appear to operate according to fixed rules. 
Nor is it clear whether their function is to indicate tone or grammar. Are they 
intended to signify pitch, emotional states, inflections, attitudes? Are they 
primarily musical or grammatical markers? Because they elude fixed rules 
of usage, Spinoza urges us to abandon the attempt to find meaning in them, 
by suggesting instead that they have become hopelessly corrupted over time. 
He also rejects the idea that everything in scripture has meaning, let alone 
infinitely many profound meanings.10 Sacks suggests an alternative: it may 
be the case that the ta’amim have become corrupt, but we cannot determine 
this until we make an investigation. In one of the most striking sections of 
his book, he sets out to discover their purpose in a Socratic spirit: “the secret 
of such investigations is to be as naïve as possible and not to fear spelling out 
the obvious” (102). His investigation leads him to reflect upon the relation of 
language and music, and the differences between Western and biblical musi-
cal notation and grammar. Despite his findings, however, he does not rule out 
the possibility that Spinoza may have been right; instead, he urges us to carry 
on the investigation.
Sacks does not venerate the ancients simply because of 
their age, nor does he take progress for granted and assume the superiority 
of the moderns. Rather, he seeks to clarify the difference because we have 
inherited the ancient world in our language. If we wish to know ourselves, 
and ultimately the truth of things, we cannot avoid exploring the history of 
logos despite the fact that it is deeply hidden in language. When he explores 
10 Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, 140.
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the Hebrew term for “time,” Sacks notes how the word evolved from the 
notion of a special occasion to the more modern notion of magnitude, that 
is, the view of time we have inherited: “This new concept of time as a magni-
tude, like other keystones of the modern world, has buried itself within our 
consciousness and now masquerades as part of our nature; but it was not 
always so” (144). 
Sacks’s approach to grammar will remind readers of his 
approach to the biblical text, particularly his rejection of method as a starting 
point. This is hardly an accident; in fact, his grammar predates the study 
of revelation. He admits that “the bulk” of Beginning Biblical Hebrew was 
written nearly forty years ago (171). The search for linguistic intentionality 
is an essential part of his approach to scripture. Both approaches cannot be 
considered “methods” because they are characterized by their awareness that 
we do not yet know the nature of revelation. Sacks’s approach to both gram-
mar and scripture is characterized by this openness:
Of recent times it has become the custom to preface any work of this 
nature with a discourse concerning Methods of Interpretation, and yet 
it is difficult to see how that can be done. To do so would presuppose 
that we already know how to read the book before we begin. Unfortu-
nately that is untrue. Each book has its own way about it, and generally 
we begin to learn how to read a book by stumbling around in it for a 
very long time until we find our way. Otherwise we risk the danger 
of reading the book by a method foreign to the intent of the author.11 
In the case of revelation, Sacks urges to proceed with caution. In the absence 
of a method, we cannot be sure whether we are discovering something real 
or imagining it to be so. Even as we start to uncover a sense of the whole, this 
is only a “minor guarantee” that we have discovered something about the 
origins, or the intentions of the author. 
In fact, Sacks’s interpretation of the Hebrew Bible does point 
us toward a central theme, namely, God’s attempt to guide men toward the 
highest good despite the ongoing resistance of creation, both earth and man, 
to this education. Sacks describes this education in terms of lifting human 
desires toward the good as “the New Way.”12 But the story is hardly straight-
forward and does not proceed in a linear fashion. As one reader explains, “the 
11 Sacks, Commentary on the Book of Genesis, ii.
12 See ibid., 11–12, 65–67, 73, 77–81, 86, 103, 123, 205, 209, 214, 220, 224–25, 230–32, 270, 276, 285–86, 
296, 300, 336–38, 353, 379, 390, 396, 398, 410, 428. See also Martin D. Yaffe, Judaism and Environmen-
tal Ethics: A Reader (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 20–23.
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book of Genesis tells the story of this lifting, but only by constant references 
backward upon itself and forward to other incidents in the history of Israel. 
The constant interweaving of past, present, and future, and the constant 
forgetting and remembering that such weaving creates, are the material of 
Genesis, which cannot be understood apart from the other books.”13 Simi-
larly Sacks’s analysis of Hebrew grammar points us to striking insights into 
subjects as diverse as causality, intellect, plurality, will, personal identity, 
and time. It is hard to deny that Sacks is on to something, even though it is 
difficult to verify his findings with quasi-mathematical certainty. In fact, 
the virtue of Sacks’s method is that its conscious openness to any and all 
difficulties encountered in the quest to discover meaning ennobles that quest 
by allowing readers to avoid dogmatic claims to knowledge and to return 
again and again to the text. 
We began with Sacks’s observation that reason and revela-
tion are the dual sources of Western civilization, and like Jacob and Esau, 
“they sit uneasily together.”14 This uneasiness is hard to deny, yet also easy to 
exaggerate. In his efforts to promote political stability, for example, Spinoza 
suggests that reason and revelation will have nothing to do with each other. 
Efforts to reconcile them lead invariably to the assertion of the superiority 
of one over the other. He notes in chapter 15 of the TTP that such efforts 
usually lead to either dogmatic belief, which rejects reason altogether, or dog-
matic rationalism, which always attempts to subordinate revelation to reason. 
Spinoza suggests, therefore, that the two be permanently separated. But this 
means that revelation can make no claims to the truth, and that reason must 
sometimes defer to revelation despite the absence of truth. Both options are 
unattractive. The achievement of Robert Sacks is to suggest an alternative 
which, though not an ultimate solution, allows the two protagonists to sit—
albeit uneasily—together. As we have seen, his critical innovation is a method 
that allows one to approach scripture as a serious guide to a flourishing life 
without succumbing to dogmatic belief. This solution may have been sug-
gested to him by one of his teachers, Leo Strauss, who pointed out:
If orthodoxy claims to know that the Bible is divinely revealed, that 
every word of the Bible is divinely inspired, that Moses was the writer 
of the Pentateuch, that the miracles recorded in the Bible have hap-
pened and similar things, Spinoza has refuted orthodoxy. But the case 
13 Clarke Cochran, “Political Science Confronts the Book: Recent Work on Scripture and Politics,” 
Journal of Politics 50 (1988): 222.
14 Sacks, Book of Job with Commentary, vii.
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is entirely different if orthodoxy limits itself to asserting that it believes 
the aforementioned things, i.e., that they cannot claim to possess the 
binding power peculiar to the known. For all assertions of orthodoxy 
rest on the irrefutable premise that the omnipotent God whose will is 
unfathomable, whose ways are not our ways, who has decided to dwell 
in the thick darkness, may exist.15 
Through his commentaries on the Bible and his Beginning Biblical Hebrew, 
Sacks offers us an alternative to the dogmatic acceptance of revelation, a 
position that inevitably undermines reason. He helps us to see that the quest 
for understanding revelation involves reason and can never abandon it. In 
doing so, Sacks’s approach contributes significantly to the reinvigoration of 
revelation as a noble source of Western civilization. 
15 Leo Strauss, “Preface” to the English translation of Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1965), 28.
